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Abstract
This paper establishes model-theoretic properties of ME∞, a variation of monadic first-order
logic that features the generalised quantifier ∃∞ (‘there are infinitely many’).
We provide syntactically defined fragments of ME∞ characterising four different semantic prop-
erties of ME∞-sentences: (1) being monotone and (2) (Scott) continuous in a given set of monadic
predicates; (3) having truth preserved under taking submodels or (4) invariant under taking quo-
tients. In each case, we produce an effectively defined map that translates an arbitrary sentence
ϕ to a sentence ϕp belonging to the corresponding syntactic fragment, with the property that ϕ
is equivalent to ϕp precisely when it has the associated semantic property.
Our methodology is first to provide these results in the simpler setting of monadic first-order
logic with (ME) and without (M) equality, and then move to ME∞ by including the generalised
quantifier ∃∞ into the picture.
As a corollary of our developments, we obtain that the four semantic properties above are
decidable for ME∞-sentences. Moreover, our results are directly relevant to the characterisation of
automata and expressiveness modulo bisimilirity for variants of monadic second-order logic. This
application is developed in a companion paper.
1 Introduction
Model theory investigates the relationship between formal languages and semantics. From this per-
spective, among the most important results are the so called preservation theorems. Such results
typically characterise a certain language as the fragment of another, richer language satisfying a cer-
tain model-theoretic property. In doing so, they therefore link the syntactic shape of a formula with
the semantic properties of the class of models it defines. In the case of classical first-order logic, notable
examples are the  Los´-Tarski theorem, stating that a first-order formula is equivalent to a universal
one if and only if the class of its models is closed under taking submodels, and Lyndon’s theorem,
stating that a first-order formula is equivalent to one for which each occurrence of a relation symbol
R is positive if and only if it is monotone with respect to the interpretation of R (see e.g. [13]).
The aim of this paper is to show that similar results also hold when considering the predicate
logic ME∞ that allows only monadic predicate symbols and no function symbols, but that goes beyond
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standard first-order logic with equality in that it features the generalised quantifier ‘there are infinitely
many’.
Generalised quantifiers were introduced by Mostowski in [19], and in a more general sense by
Lindstro¨m in [17], the main motivation being the observation that standard first-order quantifiers
‘there are some’ and ‘for all’ are not sufficient for expressing some basic mathematical concepts. Since
then, they have attracted a lot of interests, insomuch that their study constitutes nowadays a well-
established field of logic with important ramifications in disciplines such as linguistics and computer
science.1.
Despite the fact that the absence of polyadic predicates clearly restricts its expressing power,
monadic first-order logic (with identity) displays nice properties, both from a computational and
a model-theoretic point of view. Indeed, the satisfiability problem becomes decidable [3, 18], and,
in addition of an immediate application of  Los´-Tarski and Lyndon’s theorems, one can also obtain
a Lindstro¨m like characterisation result [21]. Moreover, adding the possibility of quantifying over
predicates does not increase the expressiveness of the language [2], meaning that when restricted to
monadic predicates, monadic second order logic collapses into first-order logic.
For what concerns monadic first-order logic extended with an infinity quantifier, in [19] Mostowski,
already proved its decidability, whereas from work of Va¨a¨na¨nen [22] we know that its expressive
power coincides with that of weak monadic second-order logic restricted to monadic predicates, that
is monadic first-order logic extended with a second order quantifier ranging over finite sets2.
Preservation results and proof outline.
A preservation result involves some fragment LP of a given yardstick logic L, related to a certain
semantic property P. It is usually formulated as
ϕ ∈ L has the property P iff ϕ is equivalent to some ϕ′ ∈ LP. (1)
In this work, our main yardstick logic will be ME∞. Table 1 summarises the semantic properties
(P) we are going to consider, the corresponding expressively complete fragment (LP) and preservation
theorem.
P LP Preservation Theorem
Monotonicity Positive fragment Theorem 4.4
(Definition 4.1) Pos(ME∞)
Continuity Continuous fragment Theorem 5.6
(Definition 5.1) Con(ME∞)
Preservation under submodels Universal fragment Theorem 6.4
(Definition 6.2(6.2)) Univ(ME∞)
Invariance under quotients Monadic first-order logic Theorem 6.9
(Definition 6.2(6.2)) M
Table 1: A summary of our preservation theorems
The proof of each preservation theorem is composed of two parts. The first, simpler one concerns
the claim that each sentence in the fragment satisfies the concerned property. It is usually proved
by induction on the structure of the sentence. The other direction is the expressive completeness
1For an overview see e.g. [26, 23, 30]. For an introduction to the model theory of generalised quantifiers, the interested
reader can consult for instance [24, Chapter 10].
2Extensions of monadic first-order logic with other generalised quantifiers have also been studied (see e.g. [20, 4]).
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statement, stating that within the considered logic, the fragment is expressively complete for the
property. Its verification generally requires more effort. In this paper, we will actually verify a
stronger expressive completeness statement. Namely, for each semantic property P and corresponding
fragment LP from Table 1, we are going to provide an effective translation operation (·)p : ME∞ → LP
such that
if ϕ ∈ ME∞ has the property P then ϕ is equivalent to ϕp. (2)
Since the satisfiability problem for ME∞ is decidable and the translation (·)p is effectively computable,
we obtain, as an immediate corollary of (2), that for each property P listed in Table 1
the problem whether a ME∞-sentence satisfies property P or not is decidable. (3)
The proof of each instance of (2) will follow an uniform pattern, analogous to the one employed in
the aim of obtaining similar results in the context of the modal µ-calculus [15, 8, 11]. The crux of the
adopted proof method is that, extending known results on monadic first-order logic, for each sentence
ϕ in ME∞ it is possible to compute a logically equivalent sentence in basic normal norm. Such normal
forms will take the shape of a disjunction
∨∇ME∞ , where each disjunct ∇ME∞ characterises a class of
models of ϕ satisfying the same set of ME∞-sentences of equal quantifier rank as ϕ. Based on this, it
will therefore be enough to define an effective translation (·)p for sentences in normal form, point-wise
in each disjunct ∇ME∞ , and then verify that it indeed satisfies (2).
As a corollary of the employed proof method, we thus obtain effective normal forms for sentences
satisfying the considered property.
In addition to ME∞, in this paper we are also going to consider monadic first-order logic with
and without equality, denoted respectively by ME and M. Table 2 shows a summary of the expressive
completeness and normal form results presented in this paper.
Language
M ME ME∞
Normal forms Fact 3.3 Thm. 3.9 Thm. 3.15
Monotonicity
Completeness Prop. 4.9 Prop. 4.12 Prop. 4.15
Normal forms Cor. 4.10 Cor. 4.13 Cor. 4.16
Continuity
Completeness Prop. 5.9 Fact 5.5 Prop. 5.11
Normal forms Cor. 5.10 – Cor. 5.12
Preservation under submodels
Completeness Prop. 6.7
Normal forms Cor. 6.8(1) Cor. 6.8(2) Cor. 6.8(3)
Invariance under quotients
Completeness Prop. 6.10 Prop. 6.13
Normal forms Fact 3.3 Cor. 6.14
Table 2: An overview of our expressive completeness and normal form results.
Application of obtained results: the companion paper
Parity automata are finite-state systems playing a crucial role in obtaining decidability and expres-
siveness results in fixpoint logic (see e.g. [27]). They are specified by a finite set of states A, a
distinguished, initial state a ∈ A, a function Ω assigning to each states a priority (a natural number),
and a transition function ∆ whose co-domain is usually given by a monadic logic in which the set of
(monadic) predicates coincides with A. Hence, each monadic logic L induces its own class of automata
Aut(L).
A landmark result in this area is Janin and Walukiewicz’s theorem stating that the bisimulation-
invariant fragment of monadic second order logic coincides with the modal µ-calculus [15], and the
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proof of this result is an interesting mix of the theory of parity automata and the model theory of
monadic predicate logic. First, preservation and normal forms results are used to verify that (on tree
models) Aut(Pos(ME)) is the class of automata characterising the expressive power of monadic second
order logic [29], whereas Aut(Pos(M)) corresponds to the modal µ-calculus [14], where Pos(L) denote
the positive fragment of the monadic logic L. Then, Janin-Walukieiwcz’s expressiveness theorem is a
consequence of these automata characterisations and the fact that positive monadic first-order logic
without equality provides the quotient-invariant fragment of positive monadic first-order logic with
equality (see Theorem 6.15).
In our companion paper [7], we provide a Janin-Walukiewicz type characterisation result for weak
monadic second order logic. Our proof, analogously to the case of full monadic second order logic
discussed previously, crucially employs preservation and normal form results for ME∞ listed in Tables
1 and 2.
Other versions
Results in this paper first appeared in the first author’s PhD thesis ([5, Chapter 5]); this journal
version largely expands material first published as part of the conference papers [10, 6]. In particular,
the whole of Section 6 below contains new results.
2 Basics
In this section we provide the basic definitions of the monadic predicate liftings that we study in this
paper. Throughout this paper we fix a finite set A of objects that we shall refer to as (monadic)
predicate symbols or names.
We shall also assume an infinite set iVar of individual variables.
Definition 2.1 Given a finite set A we define a (monadic) model to be a pair D = (D,V ) consisting
of a set D, which we call the domain of D, and an interpretation or valuation V : A → ℘(D). The
class of all models will be denoted by M. 
Remark 2.2 Note that we make the somewhat unusual choice of allowing the domain of a monadic
model to be empty. In view of the applications of our results to automata theory (see Section 1) this
choice is very natural, even if it means that some of our proofs here become more laborious in requiring
an extra check. Observe that there is exactly one monadic model based on the empty domain; we
shall denote this model as D∅ := (∅,∅). 
Definition 2.3 Observe that a valuation V : A→ ℘(D) can equivalently be presented via its associ-
ated colouring V [ : D → ℘(A) given by
V [(d) := {a ∈ A | d ∈ V (a)}.
We will use these perspectives interchangeably, calling the set V [(d) ⊆ A the colour or type of d. In
case D = ∅, V [ is simply the empty map. 
In this paper we study three languages of monadic predicate logic: the languages ME and M of
monadic first-order logic with and without equality, respectively, and the extension ME∞ of ME with
the generalised quantifiers ∃∞ and ∀∞. Probably the most concise definition of the full language of
monadic predicate logic would be given by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= a(x) | x ≈ y | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ∃x.ϕ | ∃∞x.ϕ,
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where a ∈ A and x and y belong to the set iVar of individual variables. In this set-up we would need
to introduce the quantifiers ∀ and ∀∞ as abbreviations of ¬∃¬ and ¬∃∞¬, respectively. However, for
our purposes it will be more convenient to work with a variant of this language where all formulas are
in negation normal form; that is, we only permit the occurrence of the negation symbol ¬ in front of
an atomic formula. In addition, for technical reasons we will add ⊥ and > as constants, and we will
write ¬(x ≈ y) as x 6≈ y. Thus we arrive at the following definition of our syntax.
Definition 2.4 The set ME∞(A) of monadic formulas is given by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= > | ⊥ | a(x) | ¬a(x) | x ≈ y | x 6≈ y | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ∃x.ϕ | ∀x.ϕ | ∃∞x.ϕ | ∀∞x.ϕ
where a ∈ A and x, y ∈ iVar. The language ME(A) of first-order logic with equality is defined as the
fragment of ME∞(A) where occurrences of the generalised quantifiers ∃∞ and ∀∞ are not allowed:
ϕ ::= > | ⊥ | a(x) | ¬a(x) | x ≈ y | x 6≈ y | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ∃x.ϕ | ∀x.ϕ
Finally, the language M(A) of first-order logic is the equality-free fragment of ME(A); that is, atomic
formulas of the form x ≈ y and x 6≈ y are not permitted either:
ϕ ::= > | ⊥ | a(x) | ¬a(x) | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ∃x.ϕ | ∀x.ϕ
In all three languages we use the standard definition of free and bound variables, and we call a
formula a sentence if it has no free variables. In the sequel we will often use the symbol L to denote
either of the languages M, ME or ME∞.
For each of the languages L ∈ {M, ME, ME∞}, we define the positive fragment L+ of L as the language
obtained by almost the same grammar as for L, but with the difference that we do not allow negative
formulas of the form ¬a(x). 
The semantics of these languages is given as follows.
Definition 2.5 The semantics of the languages M, ME and ME∞ is given in the form of a truth relation
|= between models and sentences of the language. To define the truth relation on a model D = (D,V ),
we distinguish cases.
Case D = ∅: We define the truth relation |= on the empty model D∅ for all formulas that are Boolean
combinations of sentences of the form Qx.ϕ, where Q ∈ {∃,∃∞,∀,∀∞} is a quantifier. The
definition is by induction on the complexity of such sentences; the “atomic” clauses, where the
sentence is of the form Qx.ϕ, is as follows:
D∅ 6|= Qx.ϕ if Q ∈ {∃,∃∞},
D∅ |= Qx.ϕ if Q ∈ {∀,∀∞}.
The clauses for the Boolean connectives are as expected.
Case D 6= ∅: In the (standard) case of a non-empty model D, we extend the truth relation to arbitrary
formulas, involving assignments of individual variables to elements of the domain. That is, given
a model D = (D,V ), an assignment g : iVar→ D and a formula ϕ ∈ ME∞(A) we define the truth
relation |= by a straightforward induction on the complexity of ϕ. Below we explicitly provide
the clauses of the quantifiers:
D, g |= ∃x.ϕ iff D, g[x 7→ d] |= ϕ for some d ∈ D,
D, g |= ∀x.ϕ iff D, g[x 7→ d] |= ϕ for all d ∈ D,
D, g |= ∃∞x.ϕ iff D, g[x 7→ d] |= ϕ for infinitely many d ∈ D,
D, g |= ∀∞x.ϕ iff D, g[x 7→ d] |= ϕ for all but at most finitely many d ∈ D.
The clauses for the atomic formulas and for the Boolean connectives are standard.
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In what follows, when discussing the truth of ϕ on the empty model, we always implicitly assume that
ϕ is a sentence. 
As mentioned in the introduction, general quantifiers such as ∃∞ and ∀∞ were introduced by
Mostowski [19], who proved the decidability for the language obtained by extending M with such
quantifiers. The decidability of the full language ME∞ was then proved by Slomson in [20].3 The case
for M and ME goes back already to [3, 18].
Fact 2.6 For each logic L ∈ {M, ME, ME∞}, the problem of whether a given L-sentence ϕ is satisfiable,
is decidable.
In the remainder of the section we fix some further definitions and notations, starting with some useful
syntactic abbreviations.
Definition 2.7 Given a list y = y1 · · · yn of individual variables, we use the formula
diff(y) :=
∧
1≤m<m′≤n
(ym 6≈ ym′)
to state that the elements y are all distinct. An A-type is a formula of the form
τS(x) :=
∧
a∈S
a(x) ∧
∧
a∈A\S
¬a(x).
where S ⊆ A. Here and elsewhere we use the convention that ∧∅ = > (and ∨∅ = ⊥). The positive
A-type τ+S (x) only bears positive information, and is defined as
τ+S (x) :=
∧
a∈S
a(x).
Given a one-step model D = (D,V ) we define
|S|D := |{d ∈ D | D |= τS(d)}|
as the number of elements of D that realise the type τS . 
We often blur the distinction between the formula τS(x) and the subset S ⊆ A, calling S an A-type
as well. Note that we have D |= τS(d) iff V [(d) = S, so that we may refer to V [(d) as the type of
d ∈ D indeed.
Definition 2.8 The quantifier rank qr(ϕ) of a formula ϕ ∈ ME∞ (hence also for M and ME) is defined
as follows:
qr(ϕ) := 0 if ϕ is atomic,
qr(¬ψ) := qr(ψ)
qr(ψ1 ♥ ψ2) := max{qr(ψ1), qr(ψ2)} where ♥ ∈ {∧,∨}
qr(Qx.ψ) := 1 + qr(ψ), where Q ∈ {∃,∀,∃∞,∀∞}
Given a monadic logic L we write D ≡Lk D′ to indicate that the models D and D′ satisfy exactly the
same sentences ϕ ∈ L with qr(ϕ) ≤ k. We write D ≡L D′ if D ≡Lk D′ for all k. When clear from
context, we may omit explicit reference to L. 
3The argument in [20] is given in terms of the so called Chang quantifier but is easily seen to work also for ∃∞ and
∀∞. Both Mostowski’s and Slomson’s decidability results can be extended to the case of the empty domain.
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Definition 2.9 A partial isomorphism between two models (D,V ) and (D′, V ′) is a partial function
f : D ⇀ D′ which is injective and satisfies that d ∈ V (a)⇔ f(d) ∈ V ′(a) for all a ∈ A and d ∈ Dom(f).
Given two sequences d ∈ Dk and d′ ∈ D′k we use f : d 7→ d′ to denote the partial function f : D ⇀ D′
defined as f(di) := d
′
i. We will take care to avoid cases where there exist di, dj such that di = dj but
d′i 6= d′j . 
Finally, for future reference we briefly discuss the notion of Boolean duals. We first give a concrete
definition of a dualisation operator on the set of monadic formulas.
Definition 2.10 The (Boolean) dual ϕδ ∈ ME∞(A) of ϕ ∈ ME∞(A) is the formula given by:
(a(x))δ := a(x) (¬a(x))δ := ¬a(x)
(>)δ := ⊥ (⊥)δ := >
(x ≈ y)δ := x 6≈ y (x 6≈ y)δ := x ≈ y
(ϕ ∧ ψ)δ := ϕδ ∨ ψδ (ϕ ∨ ψ)δ := ϕδ ∧ ψδ
(∃x.ψ)δ := ∀x.ψδ (∀x.ψ)δ := ∃x.ψδ
(∃∞x.ψ)δ := ∀∞x.ψδ (∀∞x.ψ)δ := ∃∞x.ψδ

Remark 2.11 Where L ∈ {M, ME, ME∞}, observe that if ϕ ∈ L(A) then ϕδ ∈ L(A). Moreover, the
operator preserves positivity of the predicates, that is, if ϕ ∈ L+(A) then ϕδ ∈ L+(A). 
The following proposition states that the formulas ϕ and ϕδ are Boolean duals. We omit its proof,
which is a routine check.
Proposition 2.12 Let ϕ ∈ ME∞(A) be a monadic formula. Then ϕ and ϕδ are indeed Boolean duals,
in the sense that for every monadic model (D,V ) we have that
(D,V ) |= ϕ iff (D,V c) 6|= ϕδ,
where V c : A→ ℘(D) is the valuation given by V c(a) := D \ V (a).
3 Normal forms
In this section we provide normal forms for the logics M, ME and ME∞. These normal forms will be
pivotal for characterising the different fragments of these logics in later sections.
Convention 3.1 Here and in the sequel it will often be convenient to blur the distinction between
lists and sets. For instance, identifying the list T = T1 · · ·Tn with the set {T1, . . . , Tn}, we may write
statements like S ∈ T or Π ⊆ T. Moreover, given a finite set Φ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn}, we write ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ϕn
as
∧
Φ, and ϕ1∨· · ·∨ϕn as
∨
Φ. If Φ is empty, we set as usual
∧
Φ = > and ∨Φ = ⊥. Finally, notice
that we write
∨
1≤m<m′≤n(ym ≈ ym′) ∨ ψ as diff(y)→ ψ.
3.1 Normal form for M
We start by introducing a normal form for monadic first-order logic without equality.
7
Definition 3.2 Given sets of types Σ,Π ⊆ ℘(A), we define the following formulas:
∇M(Σ,Π) :=
∧
S∈Σ ∃x.τS(x) ∧ ∀x.
∨
S∈Π τS(x)
∇M(Σ) := ∇M(Σ,Σ)
A sentence of M(A) is in basic form if it is a disjunction of formulas of the form ∇M(Σ). 
Clearly the meaning of the formula ∇M(Σ) is that Σ is a complete description of the collection of
types that are realised in a monadic model. Notice that ∇M(Σ,Π) = ∇M(Σ) = ∀x.⊥, for Σ = Π = ∅.
Every M-formula is effectively equivalent to a formula in basic form.
Fact 3.3 There is an effective procedure that transforms an arbitrary M-sentence ϕ into an equivalent
formula ϕ∗ in basic form.
This observation is easy to prove using Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ games – proof sketches can be found
in [12, Lemma 16.23] and [28, Proposition 4.14] –, and the decidability of the satisfiability problem for
M (Fact 2.6). We omit a full proof because it is very similar to the following more complex cases.
3.2 Normal form for ME
When considering a normal form for ME, the fact that we can ‘count types’ using equality yields a more
involved basic form.
Definition 3.4 We say that a formula ϕ ∈ ME(A) is in basic form if ϕ = ∨∇ME(T,Π) where each
disjunct is of the form
∇ME(T,Π) = ∃x.
(
diff(x) ∧
∧
i
τTi(xi) ∧ ∀z.(diff(x, z)→
∨
S∈Π
τS(z))
)
such that T ∈ ℘(A)k for some k and Π ⊆ T. 
We prove that every sentence of monadic first-order logic with equality is equivalent to a formula
in basic form. Although this result seems to be folklore, we provide a detailed proof because some
of its ingredients will be used later, when we give a normal form for ME∞. We start by defining the
following relation between monadic models.
Definition 3.5 For every k ∈ N we define the relation ∼=k on the class M of monadic models by
putting
D ∼=k D′ ⇐⇒ ∀S ⊆ A
(|S|D = |S|D′ < k or |S|D, |S|D′ ≥ k),
where D and D′ are arbitrary monadic models. 
Intuitively, two models are related by ∼=k when their type information coincides ‘modulo k’. Later
on we prove that this is the same as saying that they cannot be distinguished by a sentence of ME with
quantifier rank at most k. As a special case, observe that any two monadic models are related by ∼=0 .
For the moment, we record the following properties of these relations.
Proposition 3.6 The following hold:
1. The relation ∼=k is an equivalence relation of finite index.
2. Every E ∈M/∼=k is characterised by a sentence ϕ=E ∈ ME(A) with qr(ϕ=E) = k.
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Proof. We only prove the second statement, and first we consider the case where k = 0. The
equivalence relation ∼=0 has the class M of all monadic models as its unique equivalence class, so here
we may define ϕ=M := >.
From now on we assume that k > 0. Let E ∈ M/∼=k and let D ∈ E be a representative. Call
S1, . . . , Sn ⊆ A to the types such that |Si|D = ni < k and S′1, . . . , S′m ⊆ A to those satisfying |S′i|D ≥ k.
Note that the union of all the Si and S
′
i yields all the possible A-types, and that if a type Sj is not
realised at all, we take nj = 0. Now define
ϕ=E :=
∧
i≤n
(
∃x1, . . . , xni .diff(x1, . . . , xni) ∧
∧
j≤ni
τSi(xj)
∧ ∀z.diff(x1, . . . , xni , z)→ ¬τSi(z)
)
∧
∧
i≤m
(∃x1, . . . , xk.diff(x1, . . . , xk) ∧ ∧
j≤k
τS′i(xj)
)
,
where we understand that any conjunct of the form ∃x1, . . . , xl.ψ with l = 0 is simply omitted (or,
to the same effect, defined as >). It is easy to see that qr(ϕ=E) = k and that D′ |= ϕ=E iff D′ ∈ E.
Intuitively, ϕ=E gives a specification of E “type by type”; in particular observe that ϕ
=
D∅ ≡ ∀x.⊥. qed
Next we recall a (standard) notion of Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ game for ME which will be used to establish
the connection between ∼=k and ≡MEk .
Definition 3.7 Let D0 = (D0, V0) and D1 = (D1, V1) be monadic models. We define the game
EF=k (D0,D1) between ∀ and ∃. If Di is one of the models we use D−i to denote the other model. A
position in this game is a pair of sequences s0 ∈ Dn0 and s1 ∈ Dn1 with n ≤ k. The game consists of k
rounds where in round n+ 1 the following steps are made:
1. ∀ chooses an element di in one of the Di;
2. ∃ responds with an element d−i in the model D−i.
In this way, the sequences si ∈ Dni of elements chosen up to round n are extended to si′ := si · di.
Player ∃ survives the round iff she does not get stuck and the function fn+1 : s0′ 7→ s1′ is a partial
isomorphism of monadic models. Finally, player ∃ wins the match iff she survives all k rounds.
Given n ≤ k and si ∈ Dni such that fn : s0 7→ s1 is a partial isomorphism, we write EF=k (D0,D1)@(s0, s1)
to denote the (initialised) game where n moves have been played and k−n moves are left to be played.

Proposition 3.8 The following are equivalent:
1. D0 ≡MEk D1,
2. D0 ∼=k D1,
3. ∃ has a winning strategy in EF=k (D0,D1).
Proof. Step (1) to (2) is direct by Proposition 3.6. For (2) to (3) we give a winning strategy for ∃ in
EF=k (D0,D1) by showing the following claim.
Claim 1 Let D0 ∼=k D1 and si ∈ Dni be such that n < k and fn : s0 7→ s1 is a partial isomorphism;
then ∃ can survive one more round in EF=k (D0,D1)@(s0, s1).
Proof of Claim Let ∀ pick di ∈ Di such that the type of di is T ⊆ A. If di had already been played
then ∃ picks the same element as before and fn+1 = fn. If di is new and |T |Di ≥ k then, as at most
n < k elements have been played, there is always some new d−i ∈ D−i that ∃ can choose to match di.
If |T |Di = m < k then we know that |T |D−i = m. Therefore, as di is new and fn is injective, there
must be a d−i ∈ D−i that ∃ can choose. J
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Step (3) to (1) is a standard result [9, Corollary 2.2.9] which we prove anyway because we will need
to extend it later. We prove the following loaded statement.
Claim 2 Let si ∈ Dni and ϕ(z1, . . . , zn) ∈ ME(A) be such that qr(ϕ) ≤ k − n. If ∃ has a winning
strategy in the game EF=k (D0,D1)@(s0, s1) then D0 |= ϕ(s0) iff D1 |= ϕ(s1).
Proof of Claim If ϕ is atomic the claim holds because of fn : s0 7→ s1 being a partial isomorphism.
The Boolean cases are straightforward. Let ϕ(z1, . . . , zn) = ∃x.ψ(z1, . . . , zn, x) and suppose D0 |=
ϕ(s0). Hence, there exists d0 ∈ D0 such that D0 |= ψ(s0, d0). By hypothesis we know that ∃ has a
winning strategy for EF=k (D0,D1)@(s0, s1). Therefore, if ∀ picks d0 ∈ D0 she can respond with some
d1 ∈ D1 and have a winning strategy for EF=k (D0,D1)@(s0·d0, s1·d1). By induction hypothesis, because
qr(ψ) ≤ k− (n+ 1), we have that D0 |= ψ(s0, d0) iff D1 |= ψ(s1, d1) and hence D1 |= ∃x.ψ(s1, x). The
opposite direction is proved by a symmetric argument. J
We finish the proof of the proposition by combining these two claims. qed
Theorem 3.9 There is an effective procedure that transforms an arbitrary ME-sentence ϕ into an
equivalent formula ϕ∗ in basic form.
Proof. Let qr(ψ) = k and let JψK be the class of models satisfying ψ. As M/≡MEk is the same as
M/∼=k by Proposition 3.8, it is easy to see that ψ is equivalent to
∨{ϕ=E | E ∈ JψK/∼=k }. Now it
only remains to see that each ϕ=E is equivalent to the sentence ∇ME(T,Π) for some T,Π ⊆ ℘(A) with
Π ⊆ T.
The crucial observation is that we will use T and Π to give a specification of the types “element
by element”. Let D be a representative of the equivalence class E. Call S1, . . . , Sn ⊆ A to the types
such that |Si|D = ni < k and S′1, . . . , S′m ⊆ A to those satisfying |S′j |D ≥ k. The size of the sequence
T is defined to be (
∑n
i=1 ni) + k×m where T contains exactly ni occurrences of type Si and at least
k occurrences of each S′j . On the other hand we set Π := {S′1, . . . , S′m}. It is straightforward to check
that Π ⊆ T and ϕ=E is equivalent to ∇ME(T,Π). (Observe however, that the quantifier rank of the
latter is only bounded by k × 2|A| + 1.) In particular ϕ=D∅ ≡ ∇ME(∅,∅) = ∀x.⊥.
The effectiveness of the procedure hence follows from the fact that, given the previous bound on the
size of a normal form, it is possible to non-deterministically guess the number of disjuncts, types and
associated parameters for each conjunct and repeatedly check whether the formulas ϕ and
∨∇ME(T,Π)
are equivalent, this latter problem being decidable by Fact 2.6. qed
3.3 Normal form for ME∞
The logic ME∞ extends ME with the capacity to tear apart finite and infinite sets of elements. This is
reflected in the normal form for ME∞ by adding extra information to the normal form of ME.
Definition 3.10 We say that a formula ϕ ∈ ME∞(A) is in basic form if ϕ = ∨∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ) where
each disjunct is of the form
∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ) := ∇ME(T,Π ∪ Σ) ∧∇∞(Σ)
where
∇∞(Σ) :=
∧
S∈Σ
∃∞y.τS(y) ∧ ∀∞y.
∨
S∈Σ
τS(y).
Here T ∈ ℘(A)k for some k, and Π,Σ ⊆ ℘(A) are such that Σ ∪Π ⊆ T. 
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Intuitively, the formula∇∞(Σ) says that (1) for every type S ∈ Σ, there are infinitely many elements
satisfying S and (2) only finitely many elements do not satisfy any type in Σ. As a special case, the
formula ∇∞(∅) expresses that the model is finite. A short argument reveals that, intuitively, every
disjunct of the form ∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ) expresses that any monadic model satisfying it admits a partition
of its domain in three parts:
(i) distinct elements t1, . . . , tn with respective types T1, . . . , Tn,
(ii) finitely many elements whose types belong to Π, and
(iii) for each S ∈ Σ, infinitely many elements with type S.
Observe that basic formulas of ME are not basic formulas of ME∞.
In the same way as before, we define an equivalence relation ∼∞k on monadic models which refines
∼=k by adding information about the (in-)finiteness of the types.
Definition 3.11 For every k ∈ N we define the relation ∼∞k on the class M of monadic models by
putting
D ∼∞0 D′ ⇐⇒ always
D ∼∞k+1 D′ ⇐⇒ ∀S ⊆ A
(|S|D = |S|D′ < k or k ≤ |S|D, |S|D′ < ω or |S|D, |S|D′ ≥ ω),
where D and D′ are arbitrary monadic models. 
Proposition 3.12 The following hold:
1. The relation ∼∞k is an equivalence relation of finite index.
2. The relation ∼∞k is a refinement of ∼=k .
3. Every E ∈M/∼∞k is characterised by a sentence ϕ∞E ∈ ME∞(A) with qr(ϕ) = k.
Proof. We only prove the last point, for k > 0. Let E ∈M/∼∞k and let D ∈ E be a representative of
the class. Let E′ ∈ M/∼=k be the equivalence class of D with respect to ∼=k . Let S1, . . . , Sn ⊆ A be
all the types such that |Si|D ≥ ω, and define
ϕ∞E := ϕ
=
E′ ∧∇∞({S1, . . . , Sn}).
It is not difficult to see that qr(ϕ∞E ) = k and that D′ |= ϕ∞E iff D′ ∈ E. In particular ϕ∞D∅ ≡
∇ME∞(∅,∅,∅) = ∀x.⊥ ∧ ∀∞y.⊥. qed
Now we give a version of the Ehrenfeucht-Fras¨se´ game for ME∞. This game, which extends EF=k with
moves for ∃∞, is the adaptation of the Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ game for monotone generalised quantifiers
found in [16] to the case of full monadic first-order logic.
Definition 3.13 Let D0 = (D0, V0) and D1 = (D1, V1) be monadic models. We define the game
EF∞k (D0,D1) between ∀ and ∃. A position in this game is a pair of sequences s0 ∈ Dn0 and s1 ∈ Dn1
with n ≤ k. The game consists of k rounds, where in round n+ 1 the following steps are made. First
∀ chooses to perform one of the following types of moves:
(a) second-order move:
1. ∀ chooses an infinite set Xi ⊆ Di;
2. ∃ responds with an infinite set X−i ⊆ D−i;
3. ∀ chooses an element d−i ∈ X−i;
4. ∃ responds with an element di ∈ Xi.
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(b) first-order move:
1. ∀ chooses an element di ∈ Di;
2. ∃ responds with an element d−i ∈ D−i.
The sequences si ∈ Dni of elements chosen up to round n are then extended to si′ := si · di. ∃ survives
the round iff she does not get stuck and the function fn+1 : s0
′ 7→ s1′ is a partial isomorphism of
monadic models. 
Proposition 3.14 The following are equivalent:
1. D0 ≡ME∞k D1,
2. D0 ∼∞k D1,
3. ∃ has a winning strategy in EF∞k (D0,D1).
Proof. Step (1) to (2) is direct by Proposition 3.12. For (2) to (3) we show the following.
Claim 1 Let D0 ∼∞k D1 and si ∈ Dni be such that n < k and fn : s0 7→ s1 is a partial isomorphism.
Then ∃ can survive one more round in EF∞k (D0,D1)@(s0, s1).
Proof of Claim We focus on the second-order moves because the first-order moves are the same as
in the corresponding Claim of Proposition 3.8. Let ∀ choose an infinite set Xi ⊆ Di, we would like ∃
to choose an infinite set X−i ⊆ D−i such that the following conditions hold:
(a) The map fn is a well-defined partial isomorphism between the restricted monadic models D0X0
and D1X1,
(b) For every type S there is an element d ∈ Xi of type S which is not connected by fn iff there is
such an element in X−i.
Xi
Di D i
Figure 1: Elements of type S have coloured background.
First we prove that such a set X−i exists. To satisfy item (a) ∃ just needs to add to X−i the
elements connected to Xi by fn; this is not a problem.
For item (b) we proceed as follows: for every type S such that there is an element d ∈ Xi of type
S, we add a new element d′ ∈ D−i of type S to X−i. To see that this is always possible, observe first
that D0 ∼∞k D1 implies D0 ∼=k D1. Using the properties of this relation, we divide in two cases:
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• If |S|Di ≥ k we know that |S|D−i ≥ k as well. From the elements of D−i of type S, at most
n < k are used by fn. Hence, there is at least one d
′ ∈ D−i of type S to choose from.
• If |S|Di < k we know that |S|Di = |S|D−i . From the elements of Di of type S, at most |S|Di − 1
are used by fn. (The reason for the ‘−1’ is that we are assuming that we have just chosen a
d ∈ Xi which is not in fn.) Using that |S|Di = |S|D−i and that fn is a partial isomorphism we
can again conclude that there is at least one d′ ∈ D−i of type S to choose from.
Finally, we need to show that ∃ can choose X−i to be infinite. To see this, observe that Xi is
infinite, while there are only finitely many types. Hence there must be some S such that |S|Xi ≥ ω. It
is then safe to add infinitely many elements for S in X−i while considering point (b). Moreover, the
existence of infinitely many elements satisfying S in D−i is guaranteed by D0 ∼∞k D1.
Having shown that ∃ can choose a set X−i satisfying the above conditions, it is now clear that
using point (b) ∃ can survive the “first-order part” of the second-order move we were considering.
This finishes the proof of the claim. J
Returning to the proof of Proposition 3.14, for step (3) to (1) we prove the following.
Claim 2 Let si ∈ Dni and ϕ(z1, . . . , zn) ∈ ME∞(A) be such that qr(ϕ) ≤ k − n. If ∃ has a winning
strategy in EF∞k (D0,D1)@(s0, s1) then D0 |= ϕ(s0) iff D1 |= ϕ(s1).
Proof of Claim All the cases involving operators of ME are the same as in Proposition 3.8. We prove
the inductive case for the generalised quantifier. Let ϕ(z1, . . . , zn) be of the form ∃∞x.ψ(z1, . . . , zn, x)
and let D0 |= ϕ(s0). Hence, the set X0 := {d0 ∈ D0 | D0 |= ψ(s0, d0)} is infinite.
By assumption ∃ has a winning strategy in EF∞k (D0,D1)@(s0, s1). Therefore, if ∀ plays a second-
order move by picking X0 ⊆ D0 she can respond with some infinite set X1 ⊆ D1. We claim that
D1 |= ψ(s1, d1) for every d1 ∈ X1. First observe that if this holds then the set X ′1 := {d1 ∈ D1 | D1 |=
ψ(s1, d1)} must be infinite, and hence D1 |= ∃∞x.ψ(s1, x).
Assume, for a contradiction, that D1 6|= ψ(s1, d′1) for some d′1 ∈ X1. Let ∀ play this d′1 as the second
part of his move. Then, as ∃ has a winning strategy, she will respond with some d′0 ∈ X0 for which she
has a winning strategy in EF∞k (D0,D1)@(s0·d′0, s1·d′1). But then by our induction hypothesis, which
applies since qr(ψ) ≤ k− (n+ 1), we may infer from D1 6|= ψ(s1, d′1) that D0 6|= ψ(s0, d′0). This clearly
contradicts the fact that d′0 ∈ X0. J
Combining the claims finishes the proof of the proposition. qed
Theorem 3.15 There is an effective procedure that transforms an arbitrary ME∞-sentence ϕ into an
equivalent formula ϕ∗ in basic form.
Proof. This can be proved using the same argument as in Theorem 3.9 but based on Proposition
3.14. Hence we only focus on showing that ϕ∞E ≡ ∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ) for some T,Π,Σ ⊆ ℘(A) such that
Σ ∪ Π ⊆ T, where ϕ∞E is the sentence characterising E ∈ M/∼∞k from Proposition 3.12(2). Recall
that
ϕ∞E = ϕ
=
E′ ∧∇∞(Σ)
where Σ is the collection of types that are realised by infinitely many elements. Using Theorem 3.9
on ϕ=E′ we know that this is equivalent to
ϕ∞E = ∇ME(T,Π′) ∧∇∞(Σ)
where Π′ ⊆ T. Observe that we may assume that Σ ⊆ Π, otherwise the formula would be inconsistent.
Now separate Π′ as Π′ = Π unionmulti Σ where Π := Π′ \ Σ consists of the types that are satisfied by finitely
many elements. Then we find
ϕ∞E ≡ ∇ME(T,Π ∪ Σ) ∧∇∞(Σ).
Therefore, we can conclude that ϕ∞E ≡ ∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ). qed
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The following slightly stronger normal form will be useful in later chapters.
Proposition 3.16 For every sentence in the basic form
∨∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ) it is possible to assume,
without loss of generality, that Σ ⊆ Π ⊆ T.
Proof. This is direct from observing that ∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ) is equivalent to ∇ME∞(T,Π ∪ Σ,Σ). To
check it we just unravel the definitions and observe that ∇ME(T,Π ∪ Σ) ∧ ∇∞(Σ) is equivalent to
∇ME(T,Π ∪ Σ ∪ Σ) ∧∇∞(Σ). qed
4 Monotonicity
In this section we provide our first characterisation result, which concerns the notion of monotonicity.
Definition 4.1 Let V and V ′ be two valuations on the same domain D, then we say that V ′ is a
B-extension of V , notation: V ≤B V ′, if V (b) ⊆ V ′(b) for every b ∈ B, and V (a) = V ′(a) for every
a ∈ A \B.
Given a monadic logic L and a formula ϕ ∈ L(A) we say that ϕ is monotone in B ⊆ A if
(D,V ), g |= ϕ and V ≤B V ′ imply (D,V ′), g |= ϕ, (4)
for every pair of monadic models (D,V ) and (D,V ′) and every assignment g : iVar→ D. 
Remark 4.2 It is easy to prove that a formula is monotone in B ⊆ A if and only if it is monotone in
every b ∈ B. 
The semantic property of monotonicity can usually be linked to the syntactic notion of positivity.
Indeed, for many logics, a formula ϕ is monotone in a ∈ A iff ϕ is equivalent to a formula where all
occurrences of a have a positive polarity, that is, they are situated in the scope of an even number of
negations.
Definition 4.3 For L ∈ {M, ME} we define the fragment of A-formulas that are positive in all predicates
in B, in short: the B-positive formulas by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= ψ | b(x) | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ∃x.ϕ | ∀x.ϕ,
where b ∈ B and ψ ∈ L(A \ B) (that is, there are no occurrences of any b ∈ B in ψ). Similarly, the
B-positive fragment of ME∞ is given by
ϕ ::= ψ | b(x) | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ∃x.ϕ | ∀x.ϕ | ∃∞x.ϕ | ∀∞x.ϕ,
where b ∈ B and ψ ∈ ME∞(A \B).
In all three cases, we let PosB(L(A)) denote the set of B-positive sentences. 
Note that the difference between the fragments PosB(M(A)) and PosB(ME(A)) lies in the fact that
in the latter case, the ‘B-free’ formulas ψ may contain the equality symbol. Clearly PosA(L(A)) = L
+.
Theorem 4.4 Let ϕ be a sentence of the monadic logic L(A), where L ∈ {M, ME, ME∞}. Then ϕ is
monotone in a set B ⊆ A if and only if there is a equivalent formula ϕ ∈ PosB(L(A)). Furthermore,
it is decidable whether a sentence ϕ ∈ L(A) has this property or not.
The ‘easy’ direction of the first claim of the theorem is taken care of by the following proposition.
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Proposition 4.5 Every formula ϕ ∈ PosB(L(A)) is monotone in B, where L is one of the logics
{M, ME, ME∞}.
Proof. The case for D = ∅ being immediate, we assume D 6= ∅. The proof is a routine argument by
induction on the complexity of ϕ. That is, we show by induction, that any formula ϕ in the B-positive
fragment (which may not be a sentence) satisfies (4), for every monadic model (D,V ), valuation
V ′ ≥B V and assignment g : iVar→ D. We focus on the generalised quantifiers. Let (D,V ), g |= ϕ
and V ≤B V ′.
• Case ϕ = ∃∞x.ϕ′(x). By definition there exists an infinite set I ⊆ D such that for all d ∈ I we
have (D,V ), g[x 7→ d] |= ϕ′(x). By induction hypothesis (D,V ′), g[x 7→ d] |= ϕ′(x) for all d ∈ I.
Therefore (D,V ′), g |= ∃∞x.ϕ′(x).
• Case ϕ = ∀∞x.ϕ′(x). Hence there exists C ⊆ D such that for all d ∈ C we have (D,V ), g[x 7→
d] |= ϕ′(x) and D \ C is finite. By induction hypothesis (D,V ′), g[x 7→ d] |= ϕ′(x) for all d ∈ C.
Therefore (D,V ′), g |= ∀∞x.ϕ′(x).
This finishes the proof. qed
The ‘hard’ direction of the first claim of the theorem states that the fragment PosB(M) is complete
for monotonicity in B. In order to prove it, we need to show that every sentence which is monotone
in B is equivalent to some formula in PosB(M). We actually are going to prove a stronger result.
Proposition 4.6 Let L be one of the logics {M, ME, ME∞}. There exists an effective translation (−) :
L(A)→ PosB(L(A)) such that a sentence ϕ ∈ L(A) is monotone in B ⊆ A only if ϕ ≡ ϕ.
We prove the three manifestations of Proposition 4.6 separately, in three respective subsections.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. The first claim of the Theorem is an immediate consequence of Proposi-
tion 4.6. By effectiveness of the translation and Fact 2.6, it is therefore decidable whether a sentence
ϕ ∈ L(A) is monotone in B ⊆ A or not. qed
The following definition will be used throughout in the remaining of the section.
Definition 4.7 Given S ⊆ A and B ⊆ A we use the following notation
τBS (x) :=
∧
b∈S
b(x) ∧
∧
b∈A\(S∪B)
¬b(x),
for what we call the B-positive A-type τBS . 
Intuitively, τBS works almost like the A-type τS , the difference being that τ
B
S discards the negative
information for the names in B. If B = {a} we write τaS instead of τ{a}S . Observe that with this
notation, τ+S is equivalent to τ
A
S .
4.1 Monotone fragment of M
In this subsection we prove the M-variant of Proposition 4.6. That is, we give a translation that
constructively maps arbitrary sentences into PosB(M) and that moreover it preserves truth iff the given
sentence is monotone in B. To formulate the translation we need to introduce some new notation.
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Definition 4.8 Let B ⊆ A be a finite set of names. The B-positive variant of ∇M(Σ) is given as
follows:
∇BM (Σ) :=
∧
S∈Σ
∃x.τBS (x) ∧ ∀x.
∨
S∈Σ
τBS (x).
We also introduce the following generalised forms of the above notation:
∇BM (Σ,Π) :=
∧
S∈Σ
∃x.τBS (x) ∧ ∀x.
∨
S∈Π
τBS (x).
The positive variants of the above notations are defined as ∇+M (Σ) := ∇AM (Σ) and ∇+M (Σ,Π) :=
∇AM (Σ,Π). 
Proposition 4.9 There exists an effective translation (−) : M(A)→ PosB(M(A)) such that a sentence
ϕ ∈ M(A) is monotone in B ⊆ A if and only if ϕ ≡ ϕ.
Proof. To define the translation, by Fact 3.3, we assume, without loss of generality, that ϕ is in the
normal form
∨∇M(Σ) given in Definition 3.2, where ∇M(Σ) = ∧S∈Σ ∃x.τS(x) ∧ ∀x.∨S∈Σ τS(x). We
define the translation as
(
∨
∇M(Σ)) :=
∨
∇BM (Σ).
From the construction it is clear that ϕ ∈ PosB(M(A)) and therefore the right-to-left direction of the
proposition is immediate by Proposition 4.5. For the left-to-right direction assume that ϕ is monotone
in B, we have to prove that (D,V ) |= ϕ if and only if (D,V ) |= ϕ.
⇒ This direction is trivial.
⇐ Assume (D,V ) |= ϕ and let Σ be such that (D,V ) |= ∇BM (Σ). If D = ∅, then Σ = ∅ and
∇BM (Σ) = ∇M(Σ). Hence, assume D 6= ∅, and clearly Σ 6= ∅.
Because of the existential part of ∇BM (Σ), every type S ∈ Σ has a ‘B-witness’ in D, that is, an
element dS ∈ D such that (D,V ) |= τBS (dS). It is in fact safe to assume that all these witnesses are
distinct (this is because (D,V ) can be proved to be M-equivalent to such a model, cf. Proposition 6.12).
But because of the universal part of ∇BM (Σ), we may assume that for all states d in D there is a type
Sd in Σ such that (D,V ) |= τBSd(d). Putting these observations together we may assume that the map
d 7→ Sd is surjective.
Note however, that where we have (D,V ) |= τBS (d), this does not necessarily imply that (D,V ) |=
τS(d): it might well be the case that d ∈ V (b) but b 6∈ Sd, for some b ∈ B. What we want to do now is
to shrink V in such a way that the witnessed type (Sd) and the actually satisfied type coincide. That
is, we consider the valuation U defined as U [(d) := Sd.
4 It is then immediate by the surjectivity of
the map d 7→ Sd that (D,U) |= ∇M(Σ), which implies that (D,U) |= ϕ.
We now claim that
U ≤B V. (5)
To see this, observe that for a ∈ A \B we have the following equivalences:
d ∈ U(a) ⇐⇒ a ∈ Sd ⇐⇒ (D,V ) |= a(d) ⇐⇒ d ∈ V (a),
while for b ∈ B we can prove
d ∈ U(b) ⇐⇒ b ∈ Sd =⇒ (D,V ) |= b(d) ⇐⇒ d ∈ V (b).
This suffices to prove (5).
But from (5) and the earlier observation that (D,U) |= ϕ it is immediate by the monotonicity of
ϕ in B that (D,V ) |= ϕ. qed
4Recall that a valuation U : A→ ℘(D) can also be represented as a colouring U[ : D → ℘(A) given by U[(d) := {a ∈
A | d ∈ V (a)}.
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A careful analysis of the translation gives us the following corollary, providing normal forms for
the monotone fragment of M.
Corollary 4.10 For any sentence ϕ ∈ M(A), the following hold.
1. The formula ϕ is monotone in B ⊆ A iff it is equivalent to a formula in the basic form ∨∇BM (Σ)
for some types Σ ⊆ ℘(A).
2. The formula ϕ is monotone in every a ∈ A iff ϕ is equivalent to a formula ∨∇+M (Σ) for some
types Σ ⊆ ℘(A).
In both cases the norma forms are effective.
4.2 Monotone fragment of ME
In order to prove the ME-variant of Proposition 4.6, we need to introduce some new notation.
Definition 4.11 Let B ⊆ A be a finite set of names. The B-monotone variant of ∇ME(T,Π) is given
as follows:
∇BME(T,Π) := ∃x.
(
diff(x) ∧
∧
i
τBTi(xi) ∧ ∀z.(diff(x, z)→
∨
S∈Π
τBS (z))
)
.
When the set B is a singleton {a} we will write a instead of B. The positive variant ∇+ME(T,Π) of
∇ME(T,Π) is defined as above but with + in place of B. 
Proposition 4.12 There exists an effective translation (−) : ME(A) → PosB(ME(A)) such that a
sentence ϕ ∈ ME(A) is monotone in B if and only if ϕ ≡ ϕ.
Proof. In proposition 4.15 this result is proved for ME∞ (i.e., ME extended with generalised quantifiers).
It is not difficult to adapt the proof for ME. The translation is defined as follows. By Theorem
3.9 ,without loss of generality, assume that ϕ is in basic normal form
∨∇ME(T,Π). Then ϕ :=∨∇BME(T,Π). qed
Combining the normal form for ME and the proof of the above proposition, we therefore obtain a
normal form for the monotone fragment of ME.
Corollary 4.13 For any sentence ϕ ∈ M(A), the following hold.
1. The formula ϕ is monotone in B ⊆ A iff it is equivalent to a formula in the basic form∨∇BME(T,Π) where for each disjunct we have T ∈ ℘(A)k for some k and Π ⊆ T.
2. The formula ϕ is monotone in all a ∈ A iff it is equivalent to a formula in the basic form∨∇+ME(T,Π) where for each disjunct we have T ∈ ℘(A)k for some k and Π ⊆ T.
In both cases, normal forms are effective.
4.3 Monotone fragment of ME∞
First, in this case too we introduce some notation for the positive variant of a sentence in normal form.
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Definition 4.14 Let B ⊆ A be a finite set of names. The B-positive variant of ∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ) is
given as follows:
∇BME∞(T,Π,Σ) := ∇BME(T,Π ∪ Σ) ∧∇B∞(Σ)
∇BME(T,Λ) := ∃x.
(
diff(x) ∧
∧
i
τBTi(xi) ∧ ∀z.(diff(x, z)→
∨
S∈Λ
τBS (z))
)
∇B∞(Σ) :=
∧
S∈Σ
∃∞y.τBS (y) ∧ ∀∞y.
∨
S∈Σ
τBS (y).
When the set B is a singleton {a} we will write a instead of B. The positive variant of ∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ)
is defined as ∇+ME∞(T,Π,Σ) := ∇AME∞(T,Π,Σ). 
We are now ready to proceed with the proof of the ME∞-variant of Proposition 4.6 and thus to give
the translation.
Proposition 4.15 There is an effective translation (−) : ME∞(A) → PosB(ME∞(A)) such that a
sentence ϕ ∈ ME∞(A) is monotone in B if and only if ϕ ≡ ϕ.
Proof. By Theorem 3.15, we assume that ϕ is in the normal form
∨∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ) = ∇ME(T,Π ∪
Σ) ∧∇∞(Σ) for some sets of types Π,Σ ⊆ ℘(A) and each Ti ⊆ A. For the translation we define(∨
∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ)
)
:=
∨
∇BME∞(T,Π,Σ).
From the construction it is clear that ϕ ∈ PosB(ME∞(A)) and therefore the right-to-left direction
of the proposition is immediate by Proposition 4.5. For the left-to-right direction assume that ϕ is
monotone in B, we have to prove that (D,V ) |= ϕ if and only if (D,V ) |= ϕ.
⇒ This direction is trivial.
⇐ Assume (D,V ) |= ϕ, and in particular that (D,V ) |= ∇BME∞(T,Π,Σ). If D = ∅, then Σ = Π =
T = ∅ and ∇BME∞(T,Π,Σ) = ∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ). Hence, assume D 6= ∅. Observe that the elements of D
can be partitioned in the following way:
(a) distinct elements ti ∈ D such that each ti satisfies τBTi(x),
(b) for every S ∈ Σ an infinite set DS , such that every d ∈ DS satisfies τBS ,
(c) a finite set DΠ of elements, each satisfying one of the B-positive types τ
B
S with S ∈ Π.
Following this partition, with every element d ∈ D we may associate a type Sd in, respectively, (a) T,
(b) Σ, or (c) Π, such that d satisfies τBSd . As in the proof of proposition 4.9, we now consider the
valuation U defined as U [(d) := Sd, and as before we can show that U ≤B V . Finally, it easily from
the definitions that (D,U) |= ∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ), implying that (D,U) |= ϕ. But then by the assumed
B-monotonicity of ϕ it is immediate that (D,V ) |= ϕ, as required. qed
As with the previous two cases, the translation provides normal forms for the monotone fragment
of ME∞.
Corollary 4.16 For any sentence ϕ ∈ ME∞(A), the following hold:
1. The formula ϕ is monotone in B ⊆ A iff it is equivalent to a formula ∨∇BME∞(T,Π,Σ) for
Σ ⊆ Π ⊆ ℘(A) and T ∈ ℘(A)k for some k.
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2. The formula ϕ is monotone in every a ∈ A iff it is equivalent to a formula in the basic form∨∇+ME∞(T,Π,Σ) for types Σ ⊆ Π ⊆ ℘(A) and T ∈ ℘(A)k for some k.
In both cases, normal forms are effective.
Proof. We only remark that to obtain Σ ⊆ Π in the above normal forms it is enough to use Proposi-
tion 3.16 before applying the translation. qed
5 Continuity
In this section we study the sentences that are continuous in some set B of monadic predicate symbols.
Definition 5.1 Let U and V be two A-valuations on the same domain D. For a set B ⊆ A, we write
U ≤ωB V if U ≤B V and U(b) is finite, for every b ∈ B.
Given a monadic logic L and a formula ϕ ∈ L(A) we say that ϕ is continuous in B ⊆ A if ϕ is
monotone in B and satisfies the following:
if (D,V ), g |= ϕ then (D,U), g |= ϕ for some U ≤ωB V. (6)
for every monadic model (D,V ) and every assignment g : iVar→ D. 
Remark 5.2 As for monotonicity, but with slightly more effort, one may show that a formula ϕ is
continuous in a set B iff it is continuous in every b ∈ B. 
What explains both the name and the importance of this property is its equivalence to so called
Scott continuity. To understand it, we may formalise the dependence of the meaning of a monadic
sentence ϕ with m-free variables x in a one-step model D = (D,V ) on a fixed name b ∈ A as a map
ϕDb : ℘(D)→ ℘(Dm) defined by
X ⊆ D 7→ {d ∈ Dm | (D,V [b 7→ X]) |= ϕ(d)}.
One can then verify that a sentence ϕ is continuous in b if and only if the operation ϕDb is continuous
with respect to the Scott topology on the powerset algebras5. Scott continuity is of key importance
in many areas of theoretical computer sciences where ordered structures play a role, such as domain
theory (see e.g. [1]).
Similarly as for monotonicity, the semantic property of continuity can also be provided with a
corresponding syntactical formulation.
Definition 5.3 Let L ∈ {M, ME} The fragment of M(A) of formulas that are syntactically continuous in
a subset B ⊆ A is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= ψ | b(x) | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ∃x.ϕ,
where b ∈ B and ψ ∈ L(A \ B). In both cases, we let ConB(L(A)) denote the set of B-continuous
sentences. 
To define the syntactically continuous fragment of ME∞, we first introduce the following binary
generalised quantifier W: given two formulas ϕ(x) and ψ, we set
Wx.(ϕ,ψ) := ∀x.(ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(x)) ∧ ∀∞x.ψ(x).
The intuition behind W is the following. If (D,V ), g |= Wx.(ϕ,ψ), then because of the second
conjunct there are only finitely many d ∈ D refuting ψ. The point is that this weakens the universal
quantification of the first conjunct to the effect that only the finitely many mentioned elements refuting
ψ need to satisfy ϕ.
5The interested reader is referred to [11, Sec. 8] for a more precise discussion of the connection.
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Definition 5.4 The fragment of ME∞(A)-formulas that are syntactically continuous in a subset B ⊆ A
is given by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= ψ | a(x) | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ∃x.ϕ |Wx.(ϕ,ψ),
where b ∈ B and ψ ∈ ME∞(A\B). We let ConB(ME∞(A)) denote the set of B-continuous ME∞-sentences.

For M and ME, the equivalence between the semantical and syntactical properties of continuity was
established by van Benthem in [25].
Proposition 5.5 Let ϕ be a sentence of the monadic logic L(A), where L ∈ {M, ME}. Then ϕ is
continuous in a set B ⊆ A if and only if there is a equivalent sentence ϕ	 ∈ ConB(L(A)).
Proof. The direction from right to left is covered by Proposition 5.7 below, so we immediately
turn to the completeness part of the statement. The case of M being treated in Subsection 5.1, we
only discuss the statement for ME. Hence, let ϕ ∈ ME(A) be continuous in B. For simplicity in the
exposition, we assume B = {b}, the case of an arbitrary B being easily generalisable from what
follows. Let y := y0 . . . yk−1 be a list of k variables not occurring in ϕ. Consider the formula ϕk(y)
obtained from ϕ by substituting each occurrence of an atomic formula of the form b(x) with the
formula
∨
`<k x = y`. Define Φ := {∃y.ϕk(y) | k ∈ ω} ∪ {ϕD∅}, where ϕD∅ := ∀x.⊥ if D∅ |= ϕ and
ϕD∅ := ∃x.⊥ otherwise. By construction Φ ⊂ ConB(ME(A)). Now, notice that ¬Φ∪{ϕ} is inconsistent.
Hence, by compactness of first-order logic, there is a k ∈ ω such that ϕ |= ∨`<k ∃y.ϕk(y) ∨ ϕD∅ . By
monotonicity, ∃y.ϕk(y) |= ϕ, for every k ∈ ω, and by definition ϕD∅ |= ϕ. We therefore conclude that
ϕ ≡ ∨`<k ∃y.ϕk(y) ∨ ϕD∅ . As ConB(ME(A)) is closed under disjunctions, this ends the proof of the
statement. qed
In this paper, we extend such a characterisation to ME∞. Moreover, analogously to what we did in
the previous section, for M and ME∞ we provide both an explicit translation and a decidability result.
From this latter perspective, the case of ME remains however open.
Theorem 5.6 Let ϕ be a sentence of the monadic logic L(A), where L ∈ {M, ME∞}. Then ϕ is contin-
uous in a set B ⊆ A if and only if there is a equivalent sentence ϕ	 ∈ ConB(L(A)). Furthermore, it is
decidable whether a sentence ϕ ∈ L(A) has this property or not.
Analogously to the previous case of monotonicity, the proof of the theorem is composed of two
parts. We start with the right-left implication of the first claim (the preservation statement), which
also holds for ME.
Proposition 5.7 Every sentence ϕ ∈ ConB(L(A)) is continuous in B, where L ∈ {M, ME, ME∞}.
Proof. First observe that ϕ is monotone in B by Proposition 4.5. The case for D = ∅ being clear, we
assume D 6= ∅. We show, by induction, that any one-step formula ϕ in the fragment (which may not
be a sentence) satisfies (6), for every non-empty one-step model (D,V ) and assignment g : iVar→ D.
• If ϕ = ψ ∈ L(A \B), changes in the B part of the valuation will not affect the truth value of ϕ and
hence the condition is trivial.
• Case ϕ = b(x) for some b ∈ B: if (D,V ), g |= b(x) then g(x) ∈ V (b). Let U be the valuation given
by U(b) := {g(x)}, U(a) := ∅ for a ∈ B \ {b} and U(a) := V (a) for a ∈ A \ B. Then it is obvious
that (D,U), g |= b(x), while it is immediate by the definitions that U ≤ωB V .
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• Case ϕ = ϕ1∨ϕ2: assume (D,V ), g |= ϕ. Without loss of generality we can assume that (D,V ), g |=
ϕ1 and hence by induction hypothesis there is U ≤ωB V such that (D,U), g |= ϕ1 which clearly implies
(D,U), g |= ϕ.
• Case ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2: assume (D,V ), g |= ϕ. By induction hypothesis we have U1, U2 ≤ωB V such that
(D,U1), g |= ϕ1 and (D,U2), g |= ϕ2. Let U be the valuation defined by putting U(a) := U1(a)∪U2;
then clearly we have U ≤ωB V , while it follows by monotonicity that (D,U), g |= ϕ1 and (D,U), g |=
ϕ2. Clearly then (D,U), g |= ϕ.
• Case ϕ = ∃x.ϕ′(x) and (D,V ), g |= ϕ. By definition there exists d ∈ D such that (D,V ), g[x 7→ d] |=
ϕ′(x). By induction hypothesis there is a valuation U ≤ωB V such that (D,U), g[x 7→ d] |= ϕ′(x)
and hence (D,U), g |= ∃x.ϕ′(x).
• Case ϕ = Wx.(ϕ′, ψ) ∈ ConB(ME∞(A)) and (D,V ), g |= ϕ. Define the formulas α(x) and β as
follows:
ϕ = ∀x. (ϕ′(x) ∨ ψ(x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
α(x)
∧∀∞x.ψ(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
β
.
Suppose that (D,V ), g |= ϕ. By the induction hypothesis, for every d ∈ D which satisfies (D,V ), gd |=
α(x) (where we write gd := g[x 7→ d]) there is a valuation Ud ≤ωB V such that (D,Ud), gd |= α(x).
The crucial observation is that because of β, only finitely many elements of d refute ψ(x). Let U be
the valuation defined by putting U(a) :=
⋃{Ud(a) | (D,V ), gd 6|= ψ(x)}. Note that for each b ∈ B,
the set U(b) is a finite union of finite sets, and hence finite itself; it follows that U ≤ωB V . We claim
that
(D,U), g |= ϕ. (7)
It is clear that (D,U), g |= β because ψ (and hence β) is B-free. To prove that (D,U), g |= ∀xα(x),
take an arbitrary d ∈ D, then we have to show that (D,U), gd |= ϕ′(x) ∨ ψ(x). We consider
two cases: If (D,V ), gd |= ψ(x) we are done, again because ψ is B-free. On the other hand, if
(D,V ), gd 6|= ψ(x), then (D,Ud), gd |= α(x) by assumption on Ud, while it is obvious that Ud ≤B U ;
but then it follows by monotonicity of α that (D,U), gd |= α(x).
This finishes the proof. qed
The second part of the proof of the theorem, is thus constituted by the following stronger version
of the expressive completeness result that provides as a corollary normal forms for the syntactically
continuous fragments.
Proposition 5.8 Let L be one of the logics {M, ME∞}. There exists an effective translation (−)	 :
L(A)→ ConB(L(A)) such that a sentence ϕ ∈ L(A) is continuous in B ⊆ A if and only if ϕ ≡ ϕ	.
We prove the two manifestations of Proposition 5.8 separately, in two respective subsections.
By putting together the two propositions above, we are thence able to conclude.
Proof of Theorem 5.6. The first claim follows from Proposition 5.8. Hence, by applying Fact 2.6
to Proposition 5.8, the problem of checking whether a sentence ϕ ∈ L(A) is continuous in B ⊆ A or
not, is decidable. qed
We conjecture that Proposition 5.8, and therefore Theorem 5.6, holds also for L = ME.
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5.1 Continuous fragment of M
Since continuity implies monotonicity, by Theorem 4.4, in order to verify the M-variant of Proposition
5.8, it is enough to proof the following result.
Proposition 5.9 There is an effective translation (−)	 : PosB(M(A)) → ConB(M(A)) such that a
sentence ϕ ∈ PosB(M(A)) is continuous in B ⊆ A if and only if ϕ ≡ ϕ	.
Proof. By Corollary 4.10, to define the translation we assume, without loss of generality, that ϕ is in
the basic form
∨∇BM (Σ). For the translation, let
(
∨
∇BM (Σ))	 :=
∨
∇BM (Σ,Σ−B)
where Σ−B := {S ∈ Σ | B ∩ S = ∅}. From the construction it is clear that ϕ	 ∈ ConB(M(A)) and
therefore the right-to-left direction of the proposition is immediate by Proposition 5.7.
For the left-to-right direction assume that ϕ is continuous in B, we have to prove that (D,V ) |= ϕ
iff (D,V ) |= ϕ	, for every one-step model (D,V ). Our proof strategy consists of proving the same
equivalence for the model (D × ω, Vpi), where D × ω consists of ω many copies of each element in
D and Vpi is the valuation given by Vpi(a) := {(d, k) | d ∈ V (a), k ∈ ω}. It is easy to see that
(D,V ) ≡M (D × ω, Vpi) (see Proposition 6.12) and so it suffices indeed to prove that
(D × ω, Vpi) |= ϕ iff (D × ω, Vpi) |= ϕ	.
Consider first D = ∅. Then (D × ω, Vpi) = D∅, and therefore the claim is true since ∇BM (∅) =
∇BM (∅,∅−B) and D∅ |= ∇BM (Σ) iff Σ = ∅. Hence, assume D 6= ∅.
⇒ Let (D×ω, Vpi) |= ϕ. As ϕ is continuous in B there is a valuation U ≤ωB Vpi satisfying (D×ω,U) |=
ϕ. This means that (D×ω,U) |= ∇BM (Σ) for some disjunct ∇BM (Σ) of ϕ. Below we will use the following
fact (which can easily be verified):
(D × ω), U |= τBS (d, k) iff S \B = U [(d, k) \B and S ∩B ⊆ U [(d, k). (8)
Our claim is now that (D × ω,U) |= ∇BM (Σ,Σ−B).
The existential part of ∇BM (Σ,Σ−B) is trivially true. To cover the universal part, it remains to
show that every element of (D × ω,U) realizes a B-positive type in Σ−B . Take an arbitrary pair
(d, k) ∈ D × ω and let T be the (full) type of (d, k), that is, let T := U [(d, k). If B ∩ T = ∅ then
trivially T ∈ Σ−B and we are done. So suppose B ∩ T 6= ∅. Observe that in D × ω we have infinitely
many copies of d ∈ D. Hence, as U(b) is finite for every b ∈ B, there must be some (d, k′) with type
U [(d, k′) = V [pi (d, k
′)\B = V [pi (d, k)\B = T \B. It follows from (D×ω,U) |= ∇BM (Σ) and (8) that there
is some S ∈ Σ such that S \B = U [(d, k′)\B = U [(d, k′) and S∩B ⊆ U [(d, k)∩B = ∅. From this we
easily derive that S = U [(d, k′) and S ∈ Σ−B . Finally, we observe that S\B = U [(d, k′)\B = U [(d, k)\B
and S ∩B = ∅ ⊆ U [(d, k), so that by (8) we find that D × ω,U) |= τBS (d, k) indeed.
Finally, by monotonicity it directly follows from (D × ω,U) |= ∇BM (Σ,Σ−B) that (D × ω, Vpi) |=
∇BM (Σ,Σ−B), and from this it is immediate that (D × ω, Vpi) |= ϕ	.
⇐ Let (D×ω, Vpi) |= ∇BM (Σ,Σ−B). To show that (D×ω, Vpi) |= ∇BM (Σ), the existential part is trivial.
For the universal part just observe that Σ−B ⊆ Σ. qed
A careful analysis of the translation gives us the following corollary, providing normal forms for
the continuous fragment of M.
Corollary 5.10 For any sentence ϕ ∈ M(A), the following hold.
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1. The formula ϕ is continuous in B ⊆ A iff it is equivalent to a formula ∨∇BM (Σ,Σ−B) for some
types Σ ⊆ ℘(A), where Σ−B := {S ∈ Σ | B ∩ S = ∅}.
2. If ϕ is monotone in A then ϕ is continuous in B ⊆ A iff it is equivalent to a formula in the
basic form
∨∇+M (Σ,Σ−B) for some types Σ ⊆ ℘(A), where Σ−B := {S ∈ Σ | B ∩ S = ∅}.
5.2 Continuous fragment of ME∞
As for the previous case, the ME∞-variant of Proposition 5.8 is an immediate consequence of Theorem
4.4 and the following proposition.
Proposition 5.11 There is an effective translation (−)	 : PosB(ME∞(A)) → ConB(ME∞(A)) such
that a sentence ϕ ∈ PosB(ME∞(A)) is continuous in B if and only if ϕ ≡ ϕ	.
Proof. By Corollary 4.16, we assume that ϕ is in basic normal form, i.e., ϕ =
∨∇BME∞(T,Π,Σ). For
the translation let
(∨∇BME∞(T,Π,Σ))	 := ∨∇BME∞(T,Π,Σ)	 where
∇BME∞(T,Π,Σ)	 :=
{
⊥ if B ∩⋃Σ 6= ∅
∇BME∞(T,Π,Σ) otherwise.
First we prove the right-to-left direction of the proposition. By Proposition 5.7 it is enough to
show that ϕ	 ∈ ConB(ME∞(A)). We focus on the disjuncts of ϕ	. The interesting case is where
B ∩⋃Σ = ∅. If we rearrange ∇BME∞(T,Π,Σ) somewhat and define the formulas ϕ′, ψ as follows:
∃x.
(
diff(x) ∧
∧
i
τBTi(xi) ∧ ∀z.(¬diff(x, z) ∨
∨
S∈Π
τBS (z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ϕ′(x,z)
∨
∨
S∈Σ
τBS (z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ(z)
) ∧ ∀∞y.
∨
S∈Σ
τBS (y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ(y)
)
∧
∧
S∈Σ
∃∞y.τBS (y).
Then we find that
∇BME∞(T,Π,Σ) ≡ ∃x.
(
diff(x) ∧
∧
i
τBTi(xi) ∧Wz.(ϕ′(x, z), ψ(z))
)
∧
∧
S∈Σ
∃∞y.τBS (y),
which belongs to the required fragment because B ∩⋃Σ = ∅.
For the left-to-right direction of the proposition we have to prove that ϕ ≡ ϕ	.
⇒ Let (D,V ) |= ϕ. Because ϕ is continuous in B we may assume that V (b) is finite, for all b ∈ B.
Let ∇BME∞(T,Π,Σ) be a disjunct of ϕ such that (D,V ) |= ∇BME∞(T,Π,Σ). If D = ∅, then T = Π =
Σ = ∅, and ∇BME∞(T,Π,Σ) = (∇BME∞(T,Π,Σ))	. Hence, let D 6= ∅. Suppose for contradiction that
B ∩ ⋃Σ 6= ∅, then there must be some S ∈ Σ with B ∩ S 6= ∅. Because (D,V ) |= ∇BME∞(T,Π,Σ)
we have, in particular, that (D,V ) |= ∃∞y.τBS (x) and hence V (b) must be infinite, for any b ∈ B ∩ S,
which is absurd. It follows that B∩⋃Σ = ∅, but then we trivially conclude that (D,V ) |= ϕ	 because
the disjunct remains unchanged.
⇐ Let (D,V ) |= ϕ	. The only difference between ϕ and ϕ	 is that some disjuncts may have been
replaced by ⊥. Therefore this direction is trivial. qed
We conclude the section by stating the following corollary, providing normal forms for the contin-
uous fragment of ME∞.
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Corollary 5.12 For any sentence ϕ ∈ ME∞(A), the following hold.
1. The formula ϕ is continuous in B ⊆ A iff ϕ is equivalent to a formula, effectively obtainable from
ϕ, which is a disjunction of formulas ∇BME∞(T,Π,Σ) where T,Σ and Π are such that Σ ⊆ Π ⊆ T
and B ∩⋃Σ = ∅.
2. If ϕ is monotone (i.e., ϕ ∈ ME∞+(A)) then ϕ is continuous in B ⊆ A iff it is equivalent to
a formula, effectively obtainable from ϕ, which is a disjunction of formulas
∨∇+ME∞(T,Π,Σ),
where T,Σ and Π are such that Σ ⊆ Π ⊆ T and B ∩⋃Σ = ∅.
Proof. Notice that, from Proposition 3.16, every sentence in the basic form
∨∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ) can be
assumed such that Σ ⊆ Π ⊆ T. The claims hence follow by construction of the translation. qed
6 Submodels and quotients
There are various natural notions of morphism between monadic models; the one that we will be
interested here is that of a (strong) homomorphism.
Definition 6.1 Let D = (D,V ) and D′ = (D′, V ′) be two monadic models. A map f : D → D′ is a
homomorphism from D to D′, notation: f : D→ D′, if we have d ∈ V (a) iff f(d) ∈ V ′(a), for all a ∈ A
and d ∈ D. 
In this section we will be interested in the sentences of M, ME and ME∞ that are preserved under
taking submodels and the ones that are invariant under quotients.
Definition 6.2 Let D = (D,V ) and D′ = (D′, V ′) be two monadic models. We call D a submodel
of D′ if D ⊆ D′ and the inclusion map ιDD′ : D ↪→ D′ is a homomorphism, and we say that D′ is a
quotient of D if there is a surjective homomorphism f : D→ D′.
Now let ϕ be an L-sentence, where L ∈ {M, ME, ME∞}. We say that ϕ is preserved under taking
submodels if D |= ϕ implies D′ |= ϕ, whenever D′ is a submodel of D. Similarly, ϕ is invariant under
taking quotients if we have D |= ϕ iff D′ |= ϕ, whenever D′ is a quotient of D. 
The first of these properties (preservation under taking submodels) is well known from classical
model theory — it is for instance the topic of the  Los-Tarski Theorem. When it comes to quotients,
in model theory one is usually more interested in the formulas that are preserved under surjective
homomorphisms (and the definition of homomorphism may also differ from ours): for instance, this is
the property that is characterised by Lyndon’s Theorem. Our preference for the notion of invariance
under quotients stems from the fact that the property of invariance under quotients plays a key role
in characterising the bisimulation-invariant fragments of various monadic second-order logics, as is
explained in our companion paper [7].
6.1 Preservation under submodels
In this subsection we characterise the fragments of our predicate logics consisting of the sentences
that are preserved under taking submodels. That is, the main result of this subsection is a  Los-Tarksi
Theorem for ME∞.
Definition 6.3 The universal fragment of the set ME∞(A) is the collection Univ(ME∞(A)) of formulas
given by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= > | ⊥ | a(x) | ¬a(x) | x ≈ y | x 6≈ y | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ∀x.ϕ | ∀∞x.ϕ
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where x, y ∈ iVar and a ∈ A. The universal fragment Univ(ME(A)) is obtained by deleting the clause
for ∀∞ from this grammar, and we obtain the universal fragment Univ(M(A)) by further deleting both
clauses involving the equality symbol. 
Theorem 6.4 Let ϕ be a sentence of the monadic logic L(A), where L ∈ {M, ME, ME∞}. Then ϕ
is preserved under taking submodels if and only if there is a equivalent formula ϕ⊗ ∈ Univ(L(A)).
Furthermore, it is decidable whether a sentence ϕ ∈ L(A) has this property or not.
We start by verifying that universal formulas satisfy the property.
Proposition 6.5 Let ϕ ∈ Univ(L(A)) be a universal sentence of the monadic logic L(A), where L ∈
{M, ME, ME∞}. Then ϕ is preserved under taking submodels.
Proof. It is enough to directly consider the case L = ME∞. Let (D′, V ′) be a submodel of the monadic
model (D,V ). The case for D = ∅ being immediate, let us assume D 6= ∅. By induction on the
complexity of a formula ϕ ∈ Univ(ME∞(A)) we will show that for any assignment g : iVar → D′ we
have
(D,V ), g′ |= ϕ implies (D′, V ′), g |= ϕ,
where g′ := g ◦ ιD′D. We will only consider the inductive step of the proof where ϕ is of the form
∀∞x.ψ. Define XD,V := {d ∈ D | (D,V ), g′[x 7→ d] |= ψ}, and similarly, XD′,V ′ := {d ∈ D′ |
(D′, V ′), g[x 7→ d] |= ψ}. By the inductive hypothesis we have that XD,V ∩ D′ ⊆ XD′,V ′ , implying
that D′ \XD′,V ′ ⊆ D \XD,V . But from this we immediately obtain that
|D \XD,V | < ω implies |D′ \XD′,V ′ | < ω,
which means that (D,V ), g′ |= ϕ implies (D′, V ′), g |= ϕ, as required. qed
Before verifying the ‘hard’ side of the theorem, we define the appropriate translations from each
monadic logic into its universal fragment.
Definition 6.6 We start by defining the translations for sentences in basic normal forms.
For M-sentences in basic form we first set(
∇M(Σ)
)⊗
:= ∀z
∨
S∈Σ
τS(z)
Second, we define (
∨
i αi)
⊗ :=
∨
α⊗i . Finally, we extend the translation (−)⊗ to the collection of all
M-sentences by defining ϕ◦ := (ϕ∗)⊗, where ϕ∗ is the basic normal form of ϕ as given by Fact 3.3.
Similarly, for ME-sentences we first define(
∇ME(T,Π)
)⊗
:= ∀z
∨
S∈T∪Π
τS(z)
and then we extend it to the full language by distributing over disjunction and applying Theorem 3.9
to convert an arbitrary ME sentence into an equivalent sentence in basic normal form.
Finally, for simple basic formulas of ME∞, the translation (−)⊗ is given as follows:
(∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ))⊗ := ∀z
∨
S∈T∪Π∪Σ
τS(z) ∧ ∀∞z
∨
S∈Σ
τS(z).
The definition is thus extended to the full language ME∞ as expected: given a ME∞-sentence ϕ, by
Theorem 3.15 and Proposition 3.16 we compute an equivalent basic form
∨∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ), with Σ ⊆
Π ⊆ T, and therefore we set ϕ⊗ := ∨(∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ))⊗. 
25
The missing parts in the proof of the theorem is thence covered by the following result.
Proposition 6.7 For any monadic logic L ∈ {M, ME, ME∞} there is an effective translation (−)⊗ :
L(A)→ Univ(L(A)) such that a sentence ϕ ∈ L(A) is preserved under taking submodels if and only if
ϕ ≡ ϕ⊗.
Proof. We only consider the case where L = ME∞, leaving the other cases to the reader.
It is easy to see that ϕ⊗ ∈ Univ(ME∞(A)), for every sentence ϕ ∈ ME∞(A); but then it is immediate
by Proposition 6.5 that ϕ is preserved under taking submodels if ϕ ≡ ϕ⊗.
For the left-to-right direction, assume that ϕ is preserved under taking submodels. It is easy to
see that ϕ implies ϕ⊗, so we focus on proving the opposite. That is, we suppose that (D,V ) |= ϕ⊗,
and aim to show that (D,V ) |= ϕ.
By Theorem 3.15 and Proposition 3.16 we may assume without loss of generality that ϕ is a
disjunction of setences of the form ∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ), where Σ ⊆ Π ⊆ T. It follows that (D,V ) satisfies
some disjunct ∀z∨S∈T∪Π∪Σ τS(z) ∧ ∀∞z∨S∈Σ τS(z) of (∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ))⊗. Expand D with finitely
many elements d, in one-one correspondence with T, and ensure that the type of each di is Ti. In
addition, add, for each S ∈ Σ, infinitely many elements {eSn | n ∈ ω}, each of type S. Call the resulting
monadic model D′ = (D′, V ′).
This construction is tailored to ensure that (D′, V ′) |= ∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ), and so we obtain (D′, V ′) |=
ϕ. But obviously, D is a submodel of D′, whence (D,V ) |= ϕ by our assumption on ϕ. qed
Proof of Theorem 6.4. The first part of the theorem is an immediate consequence of Proposi-
tion 6.7. By applying Fact 2.6 to Proposition 6.7 we finally obtain that for the three concerned for-
malisms the problem of deciding whether a sentence is preserved under taking submodels is decidable.
qed
As an immediate consequence of the proof of the previous Proposition 6.7, we get effective normal
forms for the universal fragments.
Corollary 6.8 The following hold:
1. A sentence ϕ ∈ ME(A) is preserved under taking submodels iff it is equivalent to a formula∨(∀z∨S∈Σ τS(z)), for types Σ ⊆ ℘(A).
2. A sentence ϕ ∈ ME(A) is preserved under taking submodels iff it is equivalent to a formula∨(∀z∨S∈T∪Π τS(z)), for types Π ⊆ ℘(A) and T ∈ ℘(A)k for some k.
3. A sentence ϕ ∈ ME∞(A) is preserved under taking submodels iff it is equivalent to a formula∨(∀z∨S∈T∪Π∪Σ τS(z) ∧ ∀∞z∨S∈Σ τS(z)) for types Σ ⊆ Π ⊆ ℘(A) and T ∈ ℘(A)k for some k.
In all three cases, normal forms are effective.
6.2 Invariance under quotients
The following theorem states that monadic first-order logic without equality (M) provides the quotient-
invariant fragment of both monadic first-order logic with equality (ME), and of infinite-monadic predi-
cate logic (ME∞).
Theorem 6.9 Let ϕ be a sentence of the monadic logic L(A), where L ∈ {ME, ME∞}. Then ϕ is
invariant under taking quotients if and only if there is a equivalent sentence in M. Furthermore, it is
decidable whether a sentence ϕ ∈ L(A) has this property or not.
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We first state the ‘easy’ part of the first claim of the theorem. Note that in fact, we have already
been using this observation in earlier parts of the paper.
Proposition 6.10 Every sentence in M is invariant under taking quotients.
Proof. Let f : D → D′ provide a surjective homomorphism between the models (D,V ) and (D′, V ′),
and observe that for any assignment g : iVar → D on D, the composition f ◦ g : iVar → D′ is an
assignment on D′.
In order to prove the proposition one may show that, for an arbitrary M-formula ϕ and an arbitrary
assignment g : iVar→ D, we have
(D,V ), g |= ϕ iff (D′, V ′), f ◦ g |= ϕ. (9)
We leave the proof of (9), which proceeds by a straightforward induction on the complexity of ϕ, as
an exercise to the reader. qed
To prove the remaining part of Theorem 6.9, we start with providing translations from respectively
ME and ME∞ to M.
Definition 6.11 For ME-sentences in basic form we first define(
∇ME(T,Π)
)◦
:=
∧
i
∃xi.τTi(xi) ∧ ∀x.
∨
S∈Π
τS(x),
whereas for ME∞-sentences in basic form we start with defining(
∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ)
)•
:=
∧
i
∃xi.τTi(xi) ∧ ∀x.
∨
S∈Σ
τS(x).
In both cases, the translations is then extended to the full language as in Definition 6.6. 
Note that the two translations may give different translations for ME-sentences. Also observe that
the Π ‘disappears’ in the translation of the formula ∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ).
The key property of these translations is the following.
Proposition 6.12 1. For every one-step model (D,V ) and every ϕ ∈ ME(A) we have
(D,V ) |= ϕ◦ iff (D × ω, Vpi) |= ϕ. (10)
2. For every one-step model (D,V ) and every ϕ ∈ ME∞(A) we have
(D,V ) |= ϕ• iff (D × ω, Vpi) |= ϕ. (11)
Here Vpi is the induced valuation given by Vpi(a) := {(d, k) | d ∈ V (a), k ∈ ω}.
Proof. We only prove the claim for ME∞ (i.e., the second part of the proposition), the case for ME
being similar. Clearly it suffices to prove (11) for formulas of the form α = ∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ).
First of all, if D is the empty model, we find T = Π = Σ = ∅, (D,V ) = (D × ω, Vpi), and
∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ) = (∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ))•. In other words, in this case there is nothing to prove.
In the sequel we assume that D 6= ∅.
⇒ Assume (D,V ) |= ϕ•, we will show that (D × ω, Vpi) |= ∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ). Let di be such that
V [(di) = Ti in (D,V ). It is clear that the (di, i) provide distinct elements, with each (di, i) satisfying
τTi in (D × ω, Vpi) and therefore the first-order existential part of α is satisfied. With a similar
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argument it is straightforward to verify that the ∃∞-part of α is also satisfied — here we critically
use the observation that Σ ⊆ T, so that every type in Σ is witnessed in the model (D,V ), and hence
witnessed infinitely many times in (D × ω, Vpi).
For the universal parts of ∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ) it is enough to observe that, because of the universal part
of α•, every d ∈ D realizes a type in Σ. By construction, the same applies to (D × ω, Vpi), therefore
this takes care of both universal quantifiers.
⇐ Assuming that (D×ω, Vpi) |= ∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ), we will show that (D,V ) |= ϕ•. The existential part
of α• is trivial. For the universal part we have to show that every element of D realizes a type in Σ.
Suppose not, and let d ∈ D be such that ¬τS(d) for all S ∈ Σ. Then we have (D × ω, Vpi) 6|= τS(d, k)
for all k. That is, there are infinitely many elements not realising any type in Σ. Hence we have
(D × ω, Vpi) 6|= ∀∞y.
∨
S∈Σ τS(y). Absurd, because this formula is a conjunct of ∇ME∞(T,Π,Σ). qed
We will now show how the theorem follows from this. First of all we verify that in both cases M is
expressively complete for the property of being invariant under taking quotients.
Proposition 6.13 For any monadic logic L ∈ {ME, ME∞} there is an effective translation (−)~ :
L(A)→ M such that a sentence ϕ ∈ L(A) is invariant under taking quotients if and only if ϕ ≡ ϕ~.
Proof. Let ϕ be a sentence of ME∞, and let ϕ~ := ϕ• (we only cover the case of L = ME∞, the case
for L = ME is similar, just take ϕ~ := ϕ◦) We will show that
ϕ ≡ ϕ~ iff ϕ is invariant under taking quotients. (12)
The direction from right to left is immediate by Proposition 6.10. For the other direction it suffices to
observe that any model (D,V ) is a quotient of its ‘ω-product’ (D × ω, Vpi), and to reason as follows:
(D,V ) |= ϕ iff (D × ω, Vpi) |= ϕ (assumption on ϕ)
iff (D,V ) |= ϕ• (Proposition 6.12)
qed
Hence we can conclude.
Proof of Theorem 6.9. The theorem is an immediate consequence of Proposition 6.13. Finally,
the effectiveness of translation (·)•, decidability of ME∞ (Fact 2.6) and (12) yield that it is decidable
whether a given ME∞-sentence ϕ is invariant under taking quotients or not. qed
As a corollary, we therefore obtain:
Corollary 6.14 Let ϕ be a sentence of the monadic logic L(A), where L ∈ {ME, ME∞}. Then ϕ is
invariant under taking quotients if and only if there is a equivalent sentence
∨(∧
S∈Σ ∃x.τS(x) ∧
∀x.∨S∈Σ τS(x)), for types Σ ⊆ ℘(A). Moreover, such a normal form is effective.
In our companion paper [7] on automata, we need versions of these results for the monotone and
the continuous fragment. For this purpose we define some slight modifications of the translations
(·)◦ and (·)• which map positive and syntactically continuous sentences to respectively positive and
syntactically continuous formulas.
Theorem 6.15 There are effective translations (·)◦ : ME+ → M+ and (·)• : ME∞+ → M+ such that
ϕ ≡ ϕ◦ (respectively, ϕ ≡ ϕ•) iff ϕ is invariant under quotients. Moreover, we may assume that
(·)• : ConB(ME∞(A)) ∩ ME∞+ → ConB(M(A)) ∩ M+, for any B ⊆ A.
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Proof.
We define translations (·)◦ : ME+ → M+ and (·)• : ME∞+ → M+ as follows. For ME+, ME∞+-sentences
in simple basic form we define(
∇+ME(T,Π)
)◦
:=
∧
i ∃xi.τ+Ti(xi) ∧ ∀x.
∨
S∈Π τ
+
S (x),(
∇+ME∞(T,Π,Σ)
)•
:=
∧
i ∃xi.τ+Ti(xi) ∧ ∀x.
∨
S∈Σ τ
+
S (x),
and then we use, respectively, the Corollaries 4.13 and 4.16 to extend these translations to the full
positive fragments ME+ and ME∞+, as we did in Definition 6.11 for the full language.
We leave it as an exercise for the reader to prove the analogue of Proposition 6.12 for these
translations, and to show how the first statements of the theorem follows from this.
Finally, to see why we may assume that (·)• restricts to a map from the syntactically B-continuous
fragment of ME∞+(A) to the syntactically B-continuous fragment of M+(A), assume that ϕ ∈ ME∞(A)
is continuous in B ⊆ A. By Corollary 5.12 we may assume that ϕ is a disjunction of formulas of the
form ∇+ME∞(T,Π,Σ), where B ∩
⋃
Σ = ∅. This implies that in the formula ϕ• no predicate symbol
b ∈ B occurs in the scope of a universal quantifier, and so ϕ• is syntactically continuous in B indeed.
qed
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